Over the past decade the study of historical legacies has made a significant comeback in the study of post-communist politics and of comparative politics more broadly. In the process, authors have proposed a number of useful distinctions that can guide our understanding of how the communist and pre-communist past shape post-communist politics.
post-communist trajectories of the region (Janos 2000 , Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006 , PopEleches 2007 . While Janos does not deny the developmental distinctiveness of late-communist Eastern Europe, in his framework these differences are embedded in much longer-term unequal developmental patterns reflecting the North-West to South-East economic and cultural gradients (Wirtschafts-und Kulturgefälle) on the European continent dating back to the agricultural revolution starting in the 15 th century (Janos 2000:57-58) . In this view, even though communist regimes attempted to overcome the massive economic differences separating Eastern and
Western Europe through an aggressive developmental push, while at the same time trying to reduce the significant economic disparities within the communist bloc, judging by economic output ratios these efforts were at best moderately successful until the early 1980s and most of these gains were lost and even reversed as a result of the economic crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s (Janos 1993) .
Even though both of these approaches emphasize longer-term historical legacies, rather than short-term consequences of post-communist political developments 2 , they have fundamentally different implications for our understanding of the meaning and analytical utility of the term Eastern Europe for the political analysis of contemporary phenomena in the countries of the former Soviet bloc. From a "Jowittian" perspective the shared Leninist legacies provide a powerful rationale for analyzing the ex-communist countries as belonging to a coherent (though not necessarily uniform) set of empirical cases that can be meaningfully compared to other sets of countries. 3 In this sense Eastern Europe can still be plausibly used in line with Cold War usage to include countries as diverse as Poland and Slovenia on the one hand, and Azerbaijan and even Kyrgyzstan on the other. By contrast, for those embracing a "Janosian" view of legacies, Eastern Europe may not be a particularly useful category, both because it arbitrarily dichotomizes what is essentially a much more continuous gradation between center and periphery on the European continent, and because at least in its maximalist definition (mentioned 2 See, for example, McFaul's (2004) discussion of the impact of the initial power balance on post-communist regime trajectories, or Grzymala-Busse's (2007) argument about the importance of robust competition for patterns of state building among otherwise fairly similar East European countries. 3 Such comparative sets could of course be defined either regionally (e.g. Latin America) or in terms of shared political backgrounds (e.g. former fascist countries or postcolonial states.) above) it comprises countries with such dramatically different developmental legacies as to make it difficult to draw meaningful comparisons.
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Given these fundamental differences the obvious question to ask is which of these two visions has greater support based on the political developments and social scientific findings of the past quarter-century. While an exhaustive answer to this question would require a booklength manuscript, for the remainder of this paper I offer some tentative answers focusing primarily on how pre-communist and communist developmental legacies have shaped postcommunist political outcomes in a number of areas. Before doing so, however, I want to discuss two caveats.
The first caveat is of a theoretical nature. Even though the two perspectives presented above emphasize different legacies and generate different theoretical predictions, they need not be mutually exclusive. For example, in my own work on post-communist regime change I find support for both types of legacy arguments: on the one hand, intraregional differences in democratization conform closely to developmental differences at the time of the communist collapse, which in turn reflect pre-communist developmental patterns (Pop-Eleches 2007), but on the other hand when placing the former communist countries in comparative perspective we can identify a democratic deficit that affects not only the well-known democratic underperformers from the interwar Soviet Union but also (albeit to a smaller extent) the East European satellite states. (Pop-Eleches 2014) Furthermore, at least some of the theories linking post-communist political outcomes to pre-communist developmental differences explicitly incorporate the communist ideological and developmental project and thus propose mechanisms that are highly specific to the Leninist system. Thus, Darden and Grzymala-Busse's (2006) argument about the link between pre-communist literacy and anti-communist vote shares in the first post-communist elections emphasizes the role of national identity (promoted to varying degrees through precommunist education systems) in "inoculating" East Europeans against the political indoctrination project pursued by communist education systems. A similar logic underlies the theoretical argument in Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2013b) , which conceives of communist exposure as a distinctive (though not necessarily uniform) mode of political socialization but at the same time allows for the possibility that different individuals (or social groups or even countries) would exhibit stronger resistance against this socialization for reasons that are often linked to pre-communist economic and political developmental differences.
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The second caveat is methodological and concerns the choice of samples/case universes. In a sense, this point is fairly obvious: analyses focusing exclusively on post-communist countries should be expected to be more likely to emphasize intraregional diversity of outcomes and, therefore, to highlight the role of pre-communist or communist differences rather than the common of Soviet bloc membership were quite modest. 8 Economic redistribution was more effective within countries, as communist development efforts tended to target traditionally disadvantaged areas, but traditional economic differences (e.g. between Czechs and Slovaks or between Slovenians and Serbs) were still clearly discernible in 1989 and regional redistribution efforts were at least partly to blame for the disintegration of multiethnic states in Eastern Europe (Janos 1997) .
Figure 3 here
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the centrality of economic redistribution to MarxistLeninist ideology, communist regimes appear to have been much more effective in reducing domestic economic inequality. While the absence of reliable income distribution data for the precommunist and early communist period makes it difficult to establish the relative timing, magnitude, and the key mechanisms underlying this phenomenon, the cross national inequality patterns in Figure 3 suggest that by 1960 at the latest, communist countries had flatter income distributions than all but the most egalitarian European welfare states (such as Sweden). Even though income inequality increased slightly in the late 1980s as a result of partial economic liberalizations, inequality in East Europe was still quite low at the outset of the transition, especially when compared to other developing countries particularly (Latin America and subSaharan Africa).
However, this important communist legacy, which applied quite consistently across different East European countries in 1989 and set them apart as a group from most other regions, had a surprisingly short half-life. While a certain rise in inequality was probably inevitable given the far-reaching neoliberal reforms that most countries in the region underwent in the 1990s, what is striking is the dramatic divergence of inequality trajectories among different transition countries. Thus, as Figure 3 illustrates, whereas inequality in Hungary (and most other EastCentral European countries) increased moderately during the first transition decade but then stabilized and even declined in recent years, in Russia (and much of the former Soviet Union) income inequality exploded in the first five years of post-communism and has since stabilized at levels that are closer to Latin America's notoriously unequal societies than to their East European counterparts. While it is unclear whether these sub-regional differences in economic inequality can be traced back to pre-communist developmental legacies or whether they are the result of relatively contingent post-communist political developments, 9 it is obvious that the legacy of communist egalitarianism no longer applies uniformly to the entire region. Instead, the contrast between the low-to-moderate inequality in East-Central Europe and the Balkans and the high inequality in large parts of the former Soviet Union is likely to reinforce the traditional developmental differences between the two subregions and further promote divergent political outcomes.
Another area in which communism should be expected to have left a distinctive developmental imprint is education. Whereas in the pre-communist period public education access and literacy levels ranged from under 20% in Albania, Azerbaijan and Central Asia to over 90% in much of East-Central Europe and the Baltics (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006) , by 1989 primary school enrollment was quasi-universal and illiteracy had been largely eradicated across the Soviet bloc. As a result, intraregional differences in basic education virtually disappeared and the communist countries clearly outperformed most of the developing world and even many considerably wealthier countries. Furthermore, pre-primary and secondary school enrollments were dramatically expanded across the region, and while progress with respect to higher education enrollment was less impressive compared to the rest of the world, differences between various communist countries did not neatly replicate historical developmental divides. (Lewin 1991) while others worried about the pernicious effects of perverted modernization (Nodia 1996 ) -these patterns suggest that education is an area where we should see a relatively uniform common legacy of communism.
How were these educational achievements affected by the economic upheaval of the postcommunist transition? Perhaps not surprisingly, given the wide range of overall economic and political trajectories, the effects were quite heterogeneous across the region. While enrollment in basic education continued to be quasi-universal in most of the region, 11 secondary education 10 Thus, higher education enrollment was higher in Kazakhstan than in either Hungary or Poland, and the unweighted average for the non-Baltic Soviet republics was marginally higher than the average for the East European satellite states (UNICEF 2001 consideration of educational quality, which declined in most of the region (but probably more sharply in the former Soviet republics that experienced deeper and longer economic contractions), we get an overall picture whereby the traditional educational advantages of excommunist countries in primary and secondary education are slowly eroding particularly in the former Soviet Union. However, we should expect the higher basic education "stock" to set the region apart from countries with comparable economic development for at least another generation. At the same time, the great heterogeneity of transition trajectories is also reflected in educational trends, and should be expected to further deepen or at least perpetuate the differences in economic and political development between different subregions of the former Soviet bloc.
Communist central planners placed heavy emphasis on industrialization for a variety of reasons, including an ideological commitment to promoting an industrial proletariat, and because development of heavy industry was seen as an essential part of military competition with the West (Janos 2000) . By comparison, services and agriculture received considerably less attention (Jowitt 1992) , even though the latter sector initially accounted for a large part of economic output for the bulk of employment in much of the region particularly outside of East-Central
Europe. The legacy of these economic policies at the outset of the transition was an underdeveloped service sector that accounted for only 44% of regional GDP in 1989 (compared to 54% for Latin America and 65% in the OECD countries) and a fairly large agricultural sector, which accounted for roughly 18% of GDP and 30% of employment, roughly twice the Latin American average. Not surprisingly, the relative importance of agriculture was noticeably higher in Central Asia, the Caucasus and parts of the Balkans, a pattern that reflected pre-communist Overall, then, the developmental patterns discussed in this section conform to varying degrees to the two legacy conceptions discussed in the introduction. In a number of areas that set communist countries most clearly apart before 1989 -particularly the ubiquity of basic education access and the high prevalence of state ownership -the countries of the former Soviet bloc still stand out quite clearly from their non-communist counterparts and do not differ greatly from each other. For a second set of factors -particularly GDP/capita and the relative size of agrarian sector -both the region's relative backwardness and the patterns of intra-regional differences can be traced back quite clearly to pre-communist developmental patterns, which were only partially muted by communist developmental efforts and then reinforced by the early post-communist recessions.
The third group of factors consists of several "signature" communist developmental aspects -including low levels of economic inequality, widespread secondary and relatively restricted tertiary education access, and low energy effectiveness -whose post-communist resilience varied considerably across different countries. While in all three areas East European countries ended up with more favorable outcomes -lower inequality, more widespread secondary and tertiary education, and greater energy efficiency -the implications for our two legacy explanations are ambiguous. Thus, we cannot simply conclude that communist legacies were uniformly "stickier" in some countries, since the Soviet republics had greater continuity in tertiary education and energy inefficiency, while Eastern Europe preserved communist-era low income inequality and high secondary education access. On the other hand, except for education, these patterns cannot be readily traced back to pre-communist differences.
From developmental legacies to political outcomes
While this paper has been primarily concerned with the developmental legacies affecting post-communist Eastern Europe, the obvious next question is how these legacies have shaped the politics of the last 25 years. While an exhaustive answer to this question is obviously beyond the scope of the current paper, I will sketch out some tentative answers building on a few prior studies and I will propose a research agenda that may help address some of the many unresolved questions about the historical roots of post-communist political development. In doing so, I will focus on three types of outcomes: institutions, political attitudes and political behavior. protests (Greskovits 1998, Bernhard and Karakoc 2007) . Given that most of these differences applied surprisingly uniformly across different ex-communist countries and since preliminary evidence suggests that individual socialization experiences are crucial in explaining variation in both attitudes and participation (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2013b), it seems safe to assume that communist education played an important role in driving this process. However, this question would also greatly benefit from additional focus on a variety of institutional intermediaries, such as churches, unions and informal institutions, which have been shown to play an important role in the transmission of legacy effects (see e.g. Wittenberg 2006 , Howard 2003 . Given the aforementioned persistence of large state sectors in Eastern Europe, another promising explanation of post-communist exceptionalism builds on Rosenfeld's (2013) finding that democratic support is lower for middle-class respondents who are economically dependent on the state rather than the private sector.
Post-communist countries also seem to stand out in terms of the interaction between political values and political participation: whereas in most non-communist countries citizens with low democratic support levels are also significantly less likely to be politically active, in excommunist countries non-democrats are at least as politically mobilized as democrats (PopEleches 2009). I tentatively explain this outcome as a result of communist political strategies, which mobilized the lower classes in support of the regime while suppressing potentially threatening middle-class mobilization but this explanation raises a host of additional questions about the mechanisms through which these mobilizational patterns have persisted in the postcommunist period, and likely requires closer attention to the role of political parties, including
Communist successor parties, in reproducing these patterns.
At the same time, however, we can also find significant variation within the former Soviet bloc along a variety of attitudinal and behavioral dimensions, and these differences are often rooted in pre-communist and/or communist legacy differences. Thus, the post-communist protest activity (Ekiert and Kubik, 1998) .
Conclusion
In this paper I have discussed two distinctive approaches for thinking about historical legacies in the post-communist context. The first approach, which builds on the work of Ken Jowitt, emphasizes the distinctiveness of Leninist socioeconomic and political legacies, while the second approach, rooted in the writings of Andrew Janos, highlights the significant and resilient pre-communist, communist and post-communist diversity of the countries of the former Soviet bloc. The two approaches are theoretically distinct and have different implications for the continued analytical utility of the term Eastern Europe (in its Cold War connotation as referring to the countries of the Soviet bloc), and therefore it is important to distinguish more clearly between them when analyzing historical legacies in the former communist countries.
This distinction is even more important considering that the present review of developmental legacies and their political repercussions reveals that both types of legacies continue to matter after almost a quarter-century of post-communist transitions. Thus, whereas we can still discern a distinctive and fairly uniform communist imprint in areas such as primary education and the importance of the state sector in the economy, in other areas of socioeconomic development, communism was either unable to reverse longer-term intraregional differences (e.g. with respect to GDP/capita or the size of the agrarian sector) or its initially distinctive developmental imprint has been fundamentally reshaped by post-communist economic reforms (as in the case of the massive increase in income inequality in a subset of ex-communist countries.) Similarly, individuals across much of the former Soviet bloc still share a wide range of distinctive political attitudes and political participation patterns, which set them apart from their non-communist counterparts, and these differences have so far shown little sign of fading away. But at the same time we have witnessed a significant divergence of post-communist regime trajectories, which has closely tracked pre-communist developmental legacies.
These patterns present us with a puzzle about why the relative explanatory power of precommunist and communist legacies varies so significantly across different issue areas. At the most basic level, it is conceivable that different development aspects matter more for mass attitudes, while others are more important in shaping elite choices or institutional performance.
Identifying which legacies matter for what types of outcomes is a valuable theoretical exercise for post-communist politics and comparative politics more broadly. But perhaps the most exciting opportunities for future research in this area arise once we go beyond the notion of treating pre-communist and communist legacies as substitutes and instead try to identify how the two types of legacies interact with each other and with non-legacy factors to produce the complex and often unpredictable political patterns that have characterized the politics of postcommunism in the last quarter century.
